Evidence-Based Policy Advice: Updated Literature Review

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1. Introduction

The document which you have before you is the result of the second literature review undertaken by the TERRA project. Its focus is a practical one, seeking to highlight areas of policy which have an influence on radicalisation, and which policy makers at national level in European countries can usefully be aware of. In presenting it, we seek to provide inspiration on them.

The TERRA I project began in 2012, funded by the European Commission DG Home Affairs. It began with a literature review, designed to identify a process of radicalisation on which we could base our subsequent practical tools. Further, it aimed to identify the professional groups who come into contact with vulnerable individuals and groups during such a radicalisation process, so that we could tailor make advice to support them in preventing, signalling and tackling radicalisation.

The literature review produced by TERRA I can be found on our website (www.terratoolkit.eu) and has also been published in a revised form as an academic article.[i] It set out to answer a series of questions. These were:

• What are the crucial factors in the process of radicalisation which a prevention or de-radicalisation program might hope to tackle?
• Are there specific social or demographic groups which are particularly vulnerable to radicalisation?
• Who are TERRA's key figures – which professional figures play a key role in influencing a radicalising individual?
• Are there clear lessons to be learned from the literature on the role of these key figures which can influence our choices in the research process, or inform us in writing tools?
• Are there lessons learnt from previous de-radicalisation programs which might influence and inform the design of TERRA research and/or tools?

Definitions

To define terrorism, we emulate Neumann and Rogers[ii] who follow the United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes, defining terrorism as: 'any action... that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.'[iii] To define radicalisation, we attempted to refer to a broad and comprehensive definition of Schmid[iv], who defines radicalisation as: 'an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarization, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favor of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict waging. These can include either (i) the use of (non violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism, or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes. The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialization away from the mainstream or status quo—oriented positions more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate.'

Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism Model

During the course of our first review, we encountered the Staircase to Terrorism Model first published by Professor Fathali Moghaddam in 2005[v]. In it, he describes how ordinary citizens progress through experiencing a sense of "relative deprivation" – that is, that their social group do not experience the same advantages of another social group, to seeking increasingly extreme and ultimately violent solutions to this perceived problem.

Based upon The Staircase to Terrorism (Moghaddam 2005)

5th floor
The terrorist act and the sidestepping inhibitory mechanisms

4th floor
Solidification of categorical thinking and the perceived legitimacy of the terrorist organisation

3rd floor
Moral engagement

2nd floor
Displacement of aggression

1st floor
Perceived options to fight unfair treatment

Ground floor
Psychological interpretation of material conditions

Having compared Moghaddam's Staircase model to other models describing the radicalisation process we decided to adopt it as the foundation for the practical tools which TERRA would ultimately produce. Further, in 2010, Moghaddam's Staircase model was used by Doosje and De Wolf in their research into Islamist radicalisation in the Netherlands.[vi] They used it to build up a matrix describing the process of radicalisation along chronological lines. This matrix was crucial in identifying the key figures which formed the target group for TERRA: teachers and youth workers, police and other law enforcement personnel, journalists and policy makers at both local and national level.[vii]

Moghaddam's Staircase model and Doosje and De Wolf's matrix therefore formed the basis of TERRA's work. Using them, other evidence gathered from the literature review, and consultations with professionals from the groups we identified in this way, as well as with victims of terrorism and former radicals, the TERRA toolkit was produced. It was piloted in

local trials in Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands. It is now in use in several European locations and has also been adopted by non European institutions, including several US government departments, where it is used as a training tool.

Our updated review

The current, updated document reviews the literature which has been published since our original review, and modifies the initial questions in order to capture the aspects most relevant to policy makers.

Its key questions are:

- Are there new models of radicalisation which describe the process in a way which is relevant to policy makers?
- Have new insights emerged from the recent literature to which, in the light of their relevance to prevention or tackling of radicalisation, special attention should be devoted?
- Are there, conversely, specific areas of policy which the literature show to have a radicalising effect upon populations and therefore require analysis and adjustment?

The purpose of this new, updated review is twofold. Firstly, it examines whether significant advances have been made in the academic literature on radicalisation during the course of the last 3 years by way of new models or significantly deeper understanding of the problem at hand. Secondly, it looks practically at the problem from the point of view of policy makers at national level in Europe at this moment in time, and tries to distil from the literature some solutions to the complex constellation of problems currently surrounding radicalisation, ranging from right wing to Islamist radicalisation.

TERRA is a European project, and we do not attempt in this document to deliver specific recommendations as to how national policies in any one country should be designed. Rather, it is intended to raise awareness at policy making level about the particular areas of policy which are relevant to this topic, policy measures which have the potential to be detrimental to the struggle against radicalisation in European countries, and policy measures which have the potential to support it – and how.

Methodology

A literature search was conducted to reflect recent developments in the literature on evidence-based policy and government strategies to prevent radicalisation. Using the tool PsycINFO, we conducted two updated searches of previous TERRA literature reviews. The updated literature list of the TERRA I literature review, on which the TERRA Toolkit is partly based, contained published literature from early 2013 until 2016. The updated literature list of the review on evidence-based policy advice in the field of radicalisation contained published literature from 2015 until 2016, following from a brief review conducted last year. All journals were again included in this list. The combined updated literature list yielded 212 hits. Two researchers scanned all abstracts for relevance. In order to be considered relevant, articles had to contain information relevant to European radicalisation, terrorism and policy advice. When relevance was assumed, the researchers read the full article.

Articles which are directly relevant to one of the four selected good practices[viii] are mostly discussed in the concise evidence-based policy advice document which relates to these practices specifically – here we focus on issues which are relevant and a national and pan European level.

The articles and books which we read cover a wide range of topics. In order to present their content in a cohesive manner, we will discuss them under four subheadings. Firstly, we will examine whether, in the last years since TERRA's original review, models have been presented which challenge or contribute to Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism model of 2005 in a manner which can be valuable in shedding light on policy at national level. We will then proceed to examine articles which are relevant to **prevention**, approaches to **tackling radicalisation**, and **recovery, rehabilitation and de-radicalisation**.

2. New models on radicalisation

While our new search did not find any new models or approaches which render the Staircase model obsolete, it did focus upon one which can bring interesting new insights to it. Professor Arie Kruglanski of the University of Maryland has, in combination with various other authors, in recent years proposed a new approach to thinking about radicalisation – the Quest for Significance model. In an impressive body of work[ix] they present research which they have largely carried out amongst a population in Sri Lanka made up of individuals who have been involved with the LTTE, (the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam). In brief, their work suggests that radicalisation and subsequently terrorism may be motivated by a recognised and very human urge to be significant – in essence, to matter. A sense of one's own significance can be threatened by many factors – trauma, humiliation or experiencing discrimination can, amongst other factors, pose such a threat. Membership of a radical group can offer, in simple terms, the opportunity to belong to a group whose importance is greater that one's own, and simple ways to be of significance. Terrorism itself, especially suicide bombings, can offer the ultimate means to immortalise oneself, thereby becoming deeply significance.

Their approach can complement the Staircase model, adding factors which might drive an individual further up the staircase and giving an inkling as to the incentives which might tempt them onto the next stair. Their works adds depth and perspective to some of the aspects which we discuss in this review – for example the complex issues of discrimination and perceived discrimination – both aspects which can play an important role in radicalisation processes. Further, their arguments have some practical implications for policy advice, and are discussed later in this review – for example when discussing how to deal with those who have been convicted of terrorism and imprisoned.

3. Prevention

One of TERRA's goals is to tackle radicalisation before it takes root by informing professionals about (early) signals of radicalisation and promoting approaches that support the prevention of further radicalisation. In the first part of this document, we therefore attempt to shed light on the underlying mechanisms of radicalisation and prevention initiatives. We aim to raise awareness about what is proposed in the current literature and to give advice about it to support national policy makers in their generation of radicalisation prevention policies on a national and local level.

3.1 Stimulating resilience to radicalisation

It has been proposed that radicalisation can be prevented when those who are susceptible to radicalisation are supported in their resilience. Therefore, radicalisation prevention programmes can usefully focus upon those characteristics which might render those who possess them more vulnerable to radicalisation when catalytic or precipitating events occur.[x] By addressing these characteristics, a prevention policy or programme could make individuals less vulnerable, and more resilient.[xi] For example, initiatives could seek to stimulate characteristics whose lack has been related to radicalisation (e.g., lack of empathy), and could decrease those characteristics whose higher levels have been related to radicalisation (e.g., social disconnectedness). Since these characteristics form the basis for some prevention initiatives, we will discuss them first. We will then go on to discuss two example initiatives that aim to prevent radicalisation by stimulating resilience. Finally, we address prevention of radicalisation from a pedagogical perspective, in which "the development of ideals is characteristic of adolescence and within the context of a constructive pedagogical and educational environment, this development can be conductive to critical citizenship".[xii]

Characteristics

One academic perspective is that radicalised individuals are characterised by their 'normality', rather than their psychopathology.[xiii,xiv] In other words, radicalised individuals cannot necessarily been seen as mentally ill, but rather most function psychologically as normal. In addition, possessing one of the characteristics identified below does not necessarily mean that an individual is more susceptible. Rather, possessing a cluster of these characteristics, coupled with experiencing certain catalyst situations (e.g., a personal trauma or loss) might create circumstances which could foster the beginning of a radicalisation process.[xv]

The characteristics often associated with potential susceptibility to radicalisation are: feelings of dissatisfaction and insecurity[xvi], problems with social acceptance and integration[xvii], and problems with an ill-defined identity[xviii], a lack of critical thinking[xix], feelings of perceived group threat (i.e., feelings that the group that you identify with is somehow threatened), perceived personal emotional uncertainty, perceived injustice (e.g., by the authorities), perceived in-group superiority (i.e., when people view all other groups as inferior compared to their own group), perceived illegitimacy authorities (e.g., when citizens, due to perceived discrimination or mistreatment, do not trust the authorities), distance to other people, and societal disconnectedness[xx], mental health problems, distress due to stressful life events, (perceived) grievances on a political or personal level , us vs. them thinking[xxi], and finally a lack of self-esteem, agency and empathy[xxii].

Primary prevention strategies

Primary prevention strategies, in this case resilience initiatives, address those 'normal' personal factors that have been linked to radicalisation to stimulate individual resilience to future trigger factors for radicalisation. This long-term and durable strategy supports both those who do not show any signs of radicalisation and those who do show susceptibility for radicalisation. Note, however, that these resilient initiatives are numerous, have different approaches and have different representative parties, bridging both governmental and non-governmental operators. Therefore, we will discuss one initiative derived from our literature

search (Diamant), and U-CaRe, which is an initiative of TERRA II itself. They are meant to act as a source of inspiration.

Diamant (Dutch for "Diamond") is a resilience training aiming to empower individuals to prevent radicalisation.[xxiii] The training strengthens the self-esteem, agency, and empathy of their participants. Furthermore, the training aims to reduce relative deprivation and disconnectedness to society. The theory is that a preventative focus on these personal factors increases the individual's resilience to radicalisation. The training consists of three modules, which we will briefly describe. The first module 'Turning Point' supports participants in finding jobs, internships, and education, which aims to decrease feelings of relative deprivation and societal disconnectedness. In addition, discussions about family histories and identity-related issues aims to further increase the self-esteem and agency of participants. The second module 'Moral Judgement' and the third module 'Intercultural Conflict Management' focus on perspective taking and reflections on what is 'good' and what is 'bad'. The issues regarding Dutch society are also discussed, such as the role of women. By supporting participant's critical thinking, this training aims to also increase their capacity for empathy and to put experiences into a social perspective. An effectiveness study of Feddes *et al*[xxiv] showed that this training indeed increases agency, empathy, self-esteem, and perspective taking, but not feelings of relative deprivation and societal disconnectedness in individuals who were characterised as 'possibly vulnerable to radicalisation'. The training also has been shown to address radicalisation since the participant's attitudes toward ideology-based violence and own violent intentions decreased after the training. Their results also suggested that a moderate increase of self-esteem was effective in reducing radicalisation, but that too high a level of self-esteem (narcissism) was again linked to a more positive attitude toward ideology-based violence.[xxv]

For more information on Diamant, please visit their site: http://www.s-ipi.nl/jeugdhulp-diamant/

The TERRA curriculum U-CaRe aims to increase resilience to radicalisation by focusing on some personal factors related to radicalisation. TERRA's project partner University College Roosevelt, an international honours college of Utrecht University (UCR), has developed this curriculum (U-CaRe), which is a Universal Curriculum against Radicalisation in europe. It aims to prevent processes of radicalisation in high school students by fostering citizenship and social skills via seven constructive workshops. This approach is unique in that it is not targeted. Hence, all students can benefit from it and it does not stigmatise individuals at risk. In this curriculum, the source of radicalisation is tackled by 1) creating a community which allows minority members to have a positive identity within society, 2) breaking 'us' vs. 'them' divisions, 3) empowering members of underprivileged groups with practical knowledge on democratic means of defending and exercising their rights, which can form an alternative to violence, 4) promoting democracy and providing alternatives to extremist ideology, and finally, 5) stimulating critical thinking.

For more information on U-CaRe, please visit their site: http://www.ucr.nl/academic-program/Research/Terra%20II/Pages/U-CaRe-curriculum.aspx

Addressing the ideals of adolescents

Van San *et al*[xxvi] provide valuable insights regarding the prevention of radicalisation by formulating a pedagogical approach for adolescents with extreme ideals. They propose that young individuals are vulnerable to adopt extreme ideals due to common characteristics of adolescence (i.e., the need for a clear purpose in life, an identity and an ideology)[xxvii]. In

addition, they state that adolescents with more extreme ideals could construct a politically antagonistic identity when democracy does not provide them with enough room to express their ideals. They stress that the internet supports extreme ideals by enabling adolescents to become exposed to ideologies and to visit platforms on which these ideologies can be discussed in a context where no alternative discourses are on offer. Based on the latter theories and field research, Van San *et al* propose that the pedagogical climate (e.g., parents, school and youth workers) plays an important role in preventing ideals from going adrift. As these groups are closely involved in the development of adolescents, they are advised to address moral issues with debates and constant attention, and never ignore them. They note that school staff should not dismiss students with certain extreme ideals without discussing them first, because a lack of this discussion could legitimize extremist activities, or could cause these students to turn away from school and towards the internet. To conclude, educators should be generally interested in the motives of the youth, while providing them with alternative perspectives and boundaries. Hence, prevention initiatives should support parents, teachers and youth workers on a local level in their actions to address extreme ideals in adolescents. In line with this, the authors suggest that encountering fear and rejection from the public could contribute to their extreme ideals. They literally state that 'in a democracy, adolescents with strong ideals should be treated first and foremost as citizens with an interest in politics'.[xxviii]

Policy advice

- Primary radicalisation prevention programs should be implemented, as they provide a long term, durable approach which has the potential to tackle radicalisation at its roots.
- These policies and programs should address and tackle the characteristics which might render those who possess them more vulnerable to radicalisation.
- It is crucial to recognise that not all people who radicalise are mentally ill. The problems which should be addressed by primary prevention programs range from problems with identity to feelings of perceived group threat.
- Primary prevention programs (such as Diamant and U-CaRe) could either build resilience throughout the general population or address individuals who have already displayed potential vulnerability for radicalisation.
- Further research – especially into the underlying mechanisms of radicalisation and the effects of primary prevention programs, should be supported.

3.2 Tackling discrimination and addressing grievances

Other initiatives that can prevent radicalisation at an early stage should be more focused on general societal issues. Discrimination, as one of those issues, is often identified in the literature as a societal problem. It is, of course, a factor which has a negative impact on many social issues, but in this document, we aim to create awareness about the role discrimination plays in radicalisation processes. Furthermore, we also aim to create awareness about the role of grievances in radicalisation.

We suggest that discrimination and grievances should be tackled and addressed with policies and programmes in order to prevent radicalisation. It is furthermore recommended that these

initiatives are not implemented as an anti-radicalisation policy, but rather as a policy for the whole society.[xxix]

In the literature, the link between radicalisation and discrimination, and its synonyms, stereotyping and racism, is often discussed. The links could be either direct or indirect. Feddes *et al*[xxx], for example, state that feelings of unjustified treatment of individuals due to their ethnicity or religion could be linked to identity problems and perceived relative deprivation. As described above, these personal factors have been related to radicalisation.[xxxi] In line with this, Sirseloudi[xxxii] notes that "the origin of religious radicalisation is often a personal feeling of dissatisfaction and insecurity caused by different events like experiences with discrimination, failure, or the futile effort to achieve social acceptance and integration". Williamson[xxxiii] additionally shows that an increase of racism in the political and economical climate is linked to the susceptibility of young people from ethnic minority groups for violent extremism.

One line of research also investigated public opinions of Muslim communities (using opinion polls) in the U.S. and Europe in order to gain more understanding about correlations between (perceived) discrimination and the opinion of Muslim communities about political violence. The results of these studies, however, should be interpreted with caution since these Muslim communities are definitely not representatives of Islamist extremists, including those with more radical opinions. Thus, even though McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) concluded that a very small percentage of this community believed that 'jihadis are acting in defence of Islam and that their actions are morally and religiously justified', they stress that the great majority of those with more radical opinions do not conduct radical actions, and vice versa, that those who join in radical actions were not per se radical in their opinion before they joined.[xxxiv]

Despite this gap, McCauley (2012) also suggests that community attitudes and their support of political violence could make a contribution to actual political violence of potential terrorists.[xxxv] Victoroff *et al* even propose that it is likely that pro-terrorism attitudes among Muslims in the west are related to home grown terrorism.[xxxvi] Therefore, investigations of opinion polls, combined with discrimination assessments can be useful to better understand the link between discrimination and radicalisation.

Victoroff *et al*[xxxvii] investigated European polls and analysed whether support for anti-Western political violence was associated with anti-Muslim discrimination. They did find correlations, although not strong, that perceived discrimination was indeed related to the attitude that suicide bombing is justified, which suggest that prejudice toward a group and perceived anti-Muslim discrimination are possible risk factors for support of political violence. They found similar results in a U.S. population. Because the links were weak, the researchers do stress that they cannot conclude that discrimination is a major factor. They also acknowledge that discrimination in itself could not cause one to conduct a politically motivated violent attack, but they speculate that discrimination could hurt and humiliate individuals causing them to be more vulnerable to radicalisation.

McCauley[xxxviii] also investigated polls with a U.S. sample, and showed that discrimination was, although weak, a predictor of the view of the Muslim community to perceive a war on Islam. The results of McCauley, however, should be interpreted with extreme caution when it comes to community sympathy for extremism, as McGarthy *et al*[xxxix] rightly suggests that having an opinion of a perceived war on Islam does not mean that someone sympathises with terrorism. It is additionally interesting that McCauley's results place an emphasis on the

relevance of economic and political grievances (i.e., opposition to the Afghan war), as these grievances were related to a favourable opinion of a perceived war on Islam and of Al Qaeda and perceived discrimination was not. This made him conclude that in the U.S., reducing discrimination will not have an effect, unless western policies toward Muslim countries also change in order to decrease grievances. Relevant to this point is the suggestion of Mullins (2012b)[xl] that a perfect situation in the west does not mean that western Muslim communities stop identifying themselves with Muslim communities that suffer in other countries (e.g., Syria).

However, tackling discrimination still seems an important factor. Negative domestic situations could contribute to feelings of personal grievances.[xli] These feelings could make one more vulnerable to a subversive ideology, making experiencing discrimination a '*predisposing risk factor* for involvement in Islamist terrorism'.[xlii] Another relevant point about McCauley's conclusion that the role of discrimination is limited, is that he investigated populations in the U.S., which might be less representative for European populations. Since Fukuyama (2006)[xliii] suggested that European Muslims are more alienated compared to U.S. Muslim, Victoroff *et al*'s results might be more representative of the current situation in Europe.

To conclude, there seems to be evidence indicating that experiencing discrimination plays a role in radicalisation. Victoroff *et al* urgently stress that discrimination should be tackled due to its relationship to radicalisation.[xliv] These kinds of initiatives can range from laws to local societal programmes.

Possible harmful effects of well-intended policies

Of course, social initiatives that aim to do good should be aware of (context specific) subtleties, which, if not well addressed, can lead to negative or even harmful outcomes. For example, while supporting anti-discrimination initiatives, it is, according to Victoroff *et al.*[xlv] important to "distinguish between subjectively perceived discrimination and objective discriminatory treatment. Differences in self-esteem, personality, group identity, or vigilance to social cues might lead one target of discrimination to feel harmed, while another person, exposed to the same stimulus, might be less distressed or angry". Furthermore, other policies and programmes that aim to positively support certain minority groups should bear in mind that subtle parts of these policies are very relevant to overthink, as they can have negative side effects due to stereotyping. Rashid (2014)[xlvi], for example, stated about the Prevent initiative to empower Muslim women voices that "framing social problems with reference to religion alone and perpetuating dehumanizing stereotypes of the 'oppressed Muslim woman' could have negative effects on the very women that such initiatives purport to assist." She also argues that women's voices were not really as absent as was mentioned in politics at the time. Hence, accurate communication is very important.

Brown and Saeed (2015)[xlvii] delivered another example, which is related to the findings that several terrorists are highly educated, which caused counter radicalisation measures to target universities in the UK. Accordingly, they state that this security discourse regarding radicalisation at universities can put constraints on the activism, university experience, and identities of Muslims. "If this archetypical elite liberal subset of 'acceptable Muslims'–'good, moderate, integrated, educated, female Muslims cannot be free from suspicion and be critical citizens, then there is little space for other less privileged Muslims to escape the radical ghetto.[xlviii]

Policy advice

- Make tackling discrimination a priority in national policy
- Anti discrimination measures should be embedded in broader social policy and not explicitly linked to radicalisation, with a view towards strengthening the social fabric and to avoid that these policies in themselves are seen as a negative identifier of ethnic and religious groups.
- Personal and political grievances are crucial aspects which can make people vulnerable for radicalisation. Policies which can contribute to these grievances should be avoided, and policies which address these grievances are recommended.
- While implementing well intended social initiatives, policy makers should additionally be aware that they can potentially negatively identify their target groups and unwittingly contribute to stigmatisation.

3.3 Ensuring that communication from government is constructive

Policy makers in Europe today must cater to the needs of incredibly diverse, multi ethnic, multi national, multi cultural and multi faith populations. Blackwood *et al* [xlix] note the complexity of this, saying that "Where once difference was prized as the sign of a vibrant society (Prins &Salisbury, 2008), it is now feared as a sign of retreat from civil engagement (Home Office, 2001), perhaps even a retreat toward more sinister forces that stand against society." (p22)

This shift in lexicon may seem a subtle one, but should be carefully considered by policy makers in their communication to and about the populace they serve. In this document we have already noted the importance of communication from a government, both in the wake of a terror attack and otherwise. Language use has never been more critically sensitive than it is now, when policy makers refer to ethnic minorities within their domestic populations.

Alam and Husband (2013)[l] make an eloquent and convincing statement about counter terrorism in the UK. They argue that community cohesion measures taken in response to civil unrest in 2001 failed to recognise close knit Muslim communities as such but instead saw them as "self segregating." Commenting on this policy, the authors state: "Not for the first time, the political explanation for the marginalization of minority ethnic communities in British urban life was located in the flawed character of the minority communities' shared culture."(244)

Simultaneously, Prevent was introduced and, controversially used to gather intelligence on a large scale on British Muslims. They note:

"Targeted as alien and threatening by both policies, the de facto fusion of these policies in practice contributed to the consolidation of their perceived aberrant and ambiguous Britishness by the majority population, and to the sense of exclusion and stereotyping felt by the Muslim population." (249)

Although Prevent has been much commented upon in the literature on counter terrorism, and often negatively so, it has also served as a benchmark for counterterrorism strategy, in that it remains the first of it's kind within Europe to set up an early warning system to tackle

radicalisation. So how to tread the thin and fragile line between implementing a robust and functional counter terrorism strategy and avoiding marginalising sections of the population?

Key in this debate is the use of terminology in the way in which a government refers to its people. Alam and Husband comment that in allowing an Islamophobic rhetoric to creep into the public sphere, policy makers have breached a political space which was previously sacrosanct. It is imperative that a government is seen as representative of the full spectrum of its populace, and that its policies are not experienced as discriminatory – otherwise prevention activities will be undermined from their outset.

The very fact of needing to govern diverse populations in a way which encompasses profound cultural differences, without discriminating against any one sector nor using vocabulary which alienates or creates space for discord would appear fraught with difficulty. Professor Moghaddam, however,[li] offers an innovative way to approach prevention activities at the root. Multiculturalism, he argues, has failed. It creates a society in which differences between groups (social, ethnic, religious, political, or otherwise) are highlighted and celebrated. Inevitably, these differences produce competition, dissent and, in some cases, conflict. Instead, he proposes a new model – omniculturalism.

"Whereas assimilation policy aims to wash away group-based differences and arrive at a more homogeneous society and multiculturalism aims to highlight and celebrate group based differences, the goal of omniculturalism is achieved in two stages: first, arriving at a society in which intergroup relations and diversity are organized around scientifically established human universals; and, at a second stage, celebrating distinct collective identities." (341)

This can be achieved, he goes on to explain, by addressing the youngest members of a population, and through schools and other institutions always to emphasize the commonality shared by all humans. The goal of such a policy is to eliminate feelings of "us"and "them," but to support a state of being in which all humans are seen as belonging to the "us" category.

"The practical goal of omniculturalist policy is to ensure that the correct investment is made in socializing primary and secondary identities, so that the outcome is a citizenry that feels loyalty first and foremost to the primary identity, the human category. This does not mean that omniculturalist policy will be working to eradicate the allegiances that people feel to ethnic, religious, national, and other such groupings. Rather, omniculturalist policy will bring all such affiliations under the broader superordinate umbrella of affiliation with the human category. The message of omniculturalism is that we are human first and we share important characteristics as humans, prior to our membership in secondary groups such as nation and ethnicity." (342)

While Moghaddam's article does not propose specific counter terrorism policy, it does suggest a far reaching approach which could be incorporated by policy makers at national level into, for example, education policies. Prevention activities approached in this way place the emphasis on genuine prevention, intervening before any problem exists. They do not single out any faction of a population for special attention (negative or positive). Models such as the U-CaRe curriculum, discussed earlier in this document, could also usefully contribute to the dissemination of omniculturalism and a concept.

Policy advice

- Care should be exercised in all communications from the government about the population, that ethnic and religious minorities are not singled out, negatively identified, nor labelled as suspicious, either explicitly nor implicitly.

4. Approach (tackling what's out there)

So far we have focussed upon the prevention phase, aiming at nipping radicalisation in the bud before it can cause damage and unrest. But what to do when radicalisation has already occurred and policy makers have to deal with the aftermath of an attack, or radicalising content online?

4.1 The vicious circle (attack, suspicion, discrimination, radicalisation, attack)

In a natural progression from our discussion on discrimination, and ensuring constructive communication from governments, we now turn our attention to what happens to these two themes once violence or a full blown terrorist attack has taken place.

Victoroff *et al*[lii] discuss the vicious circle of prejudice (i.e., discrimination) and radicalisation, in which discrimination and radicalisation are two forces which if left unchecked, keep reinforcing one another. The vicious circle that they identify concerns Islamist radicalisation. It starts with two observations: that jihadi violence has caused non-Muslim western citizens to be frightened or angry and, simultaneously, anti- Muslim discrimination in Western Europe is a reality, emerging as resistance to immigration, discriminatory behaviour in the housing and job markets and even hate crime. Accordingly, Victoroff *et al* explain that when a group (the so called "in-group") feels anxious, insecure and threatened or experiences dissimilarity of values, it is more likely that this group is hostile toward the other group (the so called "out-group"). In this specific case, these groups are non-Muslim and Muslim western communities. In addition, they stress that positive contacts between different groups could be related to reduced inter-group hostility, but that negative contact situations predict out-group hostility and could even be related to radicalisation. They therefore suggest that violence begets fear, which in turn begets prejusticem leading to discrimination against the out- group. Experiencing this discrimination, the out group is them more inclined to support violence, and thereby increasing the likelihood of more violence, *ad infinitum.*

Due to this vicious circle, Victoroff *et al* suggest that anti-discrimination policies should increase collective feelings in both groups and support positive inter-group relations, by, for example, school practices. Thus, less discrimination could have a positive effect, though the researchers do acknowledge that anti-discrimination policies and laws could have fewer effects when Muslim diaspora communities isolate themselves and when anti-western rhetoric's influence young Muslims.

Arciszewski *et al*[liii] mirror these findings. They approach the problem from a slightly different angle, questioning how terrorist groups are able to recruit to their cause. They conclude that in times of threat or perceived threat, people tend to flock with those whom they perceive as their in-group – that is, people of a similar background to themselves. Discrimination and group segregation in the wake of terrorist activity – especially in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack – can in turn contribute to creating a fertile ground for recruiters to a terrorist organisation. They note:

"In circumstances of terrorism threat, people tend to focus on their in-group and to be more willing to exclude the out-group. This process could in turn be a threat to the out-group

identity, and even more if this group is a minority already with a bad stereotype. We can argue that restoring their identity could be one major motive for people to join terrorist groups or for having sympathy for them." (p15)

This lead us to draw various new conclusions regarding the need for communication following a terrorist attack. It is crucial that this immediate reaction of people being drawn to their own kind and perhaps being led into behaving in a discriminatory way be tackled. Concrete suggestions may be made on the basis of these findings:

Policy advice

- Awareness about the vicious circle of discrimination, radicalisation and attack is important.
- Policies which are aimed at interrupting the vicious circle must tackle both of the parties which have a role in it, rather than just one of them – ie both the terrorist groups and groups which espouse hate and hate speech in society.
- In official communications following a terrorist attack, emphasis should be laid on the fact that the whole of society has been affected and damaged – not one specific group.
- In the case of an attack by an Islamist group, it is crucial that the Muslim organisations are vocal and public in their criticism of the attack.
- In the wake of a terrorist attack, authorities are particularly alert to discrimination, and public in attacking and denouncing it.

4.2 Dealing with online propaganda.

Besides identifying the vicious circle model, recently the attention of researchers has also turned to how to tackle extremist content online.

Communication on the Internet can contribute in various ways to radicalisation. Online radicalisation has become an essential phenomenon and a priority to understand and tackle in order to prevent terrorism, since radicals and terrorists use the Internet to meet people who think alike, to recruit, and to support radicalisation processes of others.[liv] Peter Neumann[lv], therefore, considers it crucial that law enforcement and intelligence agencies counter online radicalisation as it is rapidly changing and developing. In 2013, he presented an interesting model that we will describe as an inspiration source to tackle online radicalisation.

Neumann describes how terrorists use the Internet for logistics and reconnaissance, to raise money, to disseminate training manuals and videos, and possibly even as a weapon itself. Besides these operational goals, terrorist use the Internet for communicative purposes to recruit new members, generate political support and to publish their information and manifesto. This is done with, for example, the creation of websites and forums on which one can read about their ideological views and other related subjects, and on which people can meet others, bond, and discuss issues.

The relevance of both of these opportunities for radicalisation that the Internet provides have been confirmed by other authors. Mullen confirms that radicalisation is a group process and that these group processes can also exists online.[lvi] Additionally, Thomas *et al*[lvii] confirm that social interactions, hence group processes, are involved in radicalisation. They add the nuance that within these social interactions, one should perceive that extreme action is legitimate to become radicalised. Besides social interactions, online radicalisation delivers a platform on which individuals can be easily exposed to ideology, which is also according to Mullins, a

risk factor for radicalisation.[lviii] Furthermore, multimedia products can be disseminated. Terrorist are additionally familiar with social networking and user-generated content, which can cause people who uses ordinary sites such as YouTube to stumble in to radical propaganda by mistake. Finally, so-called jihobbyists support forums and social networking sites by helping with the production and editing. Smart phones and apps are also likely to become more important with this phenomenon.

Accordingly, Neumann described six processes and dynamics that help to understand why the Internet could facilitate online radicalisation. Exposure to extremist content could support (1) the salience of mortality, which has been shown to increase the support for terrorist acts, and (2) a sense of moral outrage against the West. Furthermore, as is stated above, social environments are important for radicalisation, and the Internet facilitates these environments. The Internet can, for example, develop (3) criminogenic environments, in which individuals interact with others who have the same extremist views. In addition, a sense of anonymity, facilitated by the Internet, supports individuals to hide their identities and to not feel responsible for their actions, which supports polarisation due to (4) online disinhibition.

Because these interactivity processes can happen at home, Sageman (2007)[lix] declares this as a problematic aspect of the Internet. Social interactions can also support the mobilization of radicals (5). As individuals are able to play the role of their idealised self on the internet, at one point they can start to behave more and more according to the role they play on the Internet. The last explanation is that, simply put, the Internet is able to connect people with similar views and interests. In other words, the Internet (6) helps individuals to link up with terrorist structures.

Besides these six processes proposed by Neumann, other processes that support online radicalisation have been proposed by other academics. According to Sageman (2008)[lx], active participation through social media could support radicalisation. A further risk factor associated with the Internet is that the greater likelihood to self-disclosure, due to anonymity, could make an individual more intimate towards an online group.[lxi]

Neumann ends his article by describing three strategies to tackle online radicalisation, of which two are proposed to be constructive. To support all these counter strategies, Neumann stresses the importance of clarifying what officials are able to do within the field of cyberspace (e.g., certain rules, oversight, and review mechanisms). For example, officials should be able to answer questions about the Internet, such as 'What is domestic?', What is public?' and 'What are the rules for data mining?'. Furthermore, Neumann recommends that governments form informal partnerships with Silicon-Valley-based technology companies and convene nongovernmental actors who are able to support prevention of online radicalisation.

The first strategy is called *reducing the supply*. This method seems the least desirable due to the limitations regarding online censorship, nation wide filtering, aggressive and commercial takedowns of specific websites and content, prosecutions against extremists Internet entrepreneurs, and finally the hiding of certain contents. This line of reasoning is supported by a perspective of Van San *et al*, who state that the banning of individuals with more extreme ideals from regular Internet forums could, besides the reinforcement of their perspective that freedom of speech is not applicable to them, cause them to seek more radical websites on which they can discuss their ideas without any alternative discourses.[lxii]

For the second strategy, the focus lies on *reducing the demand,* for which several strategies are possible and advisable. Neumann, for example, states that governments can have a limited but positive effect when they promote pluralism, democracy and peaceful means for good ideas in virtual marketplaces. To achieve this, it is important to create an environment in which civic actors feel able to challenge extremism. This environment can again be achieved by creating awareness among parents, teachers and community leaders. Another strategy could be to build the capacity of these civic actors who could challenge extremism. For this, governments should connect those good people who are suitable for this job, rather than telling them what to do. One specific interesting initiative which reduced the demand in the U.S. was the implementation of online workshops for Muslim community leaders to strengthen their information technology skills. Additionally, community groups (rather than the government, who can act as enabler) can disseminate counter messages that challenge extremist ideologies. For this, networks should be created in which organisations (e.g., advertising agencies) support these community groups. One could also engage in direct discussions with extremists on, for example, virtual spaces. Another long-term solution, according to Neumann, is to promote digital literacy. Digital literacy can be achieved when young people are educated about online extremism and radicalisation. They should be taught to detect the signals and to have a critical attitude.

For the third short-term strategy, Neumann recommends that law enforcements and intelligence services *exploit online communications and gain intelligence* in the most comprehensive and systematic fashion possible. Strategic intelligence can be gained with sentiment and network analyses. Analysts could investigate online radicalisation predictors and possibly predict terrorist actions. To gain tactical intelligence, Neumann suggests analysing publically available information to prevent terrorism attacks. For example, by analysing extremist forums and other networking sites, analysts can identify lone wolves and networks of associations. Finally, by exploiting online information, one could identify evidence for prosecutions of extremists.

Policy advice

- Be aware of the importance of the Internet for radicalisation – that it can be used to spread extremist material, to recruit and to mobilise terrorist groups.
- Both long and short term measures need to be taken to tackle online radicalisation. Short term measures can include using extremist sites to monitor terrorist activity. Longer term activities can include incorporating education on online extremism into standard school curricula, and promoting online fora where open debate can take place.
- Laws and regulations on the use of online space need to be clarified so that the rules for what is and is not allowed online are clear and readily available.
- Governments should form partnerships with technology companies and with non governmental actors so that, through collaboration, effective counter narratives and the potential for positive online debate can be fully utilized.

4.3 Dealing with lone wolf terrorism

Even though violent attacks of so-called lone wolves accounted for only 1,28% of all terrorist attacks until 2007, scholars stressed their concern for an increase of this number.[lxiii] As lone wolf attacks can have an enormous impact on a society, it seems crucial to raise some awareness about this specific branch of terrorism. Simon (2013)[lxiv] defines lone wolf terrorism

as "the use or threat of violence or non-violent sabotage (including cyber attacks) by an individual acting alone, or with minimal support from one or two other people, to further a political, social, religious, financial or other related goal, or, when not having such an objective, nevertheless has the same effect upon government and society in terms of creating fear and/or disrupting daily life and/or causing government and society to react with heightened security and/or other responses". In this chapter, we briefly describe lone wolf terrorism on the basis of a psychoanalytical model of Meloy and Yakeley (2014)[lxv] which maps several characteristics of lone wolves. This preliminary knowledge could be of use to better understand, detect, prevent and tackle this phenomenon. Note that several characterises correspond with those of group radicalisation.

Meloy and Yakeley view the experience of personal grievances regarding personal, historical or political events, and the moral outrage of lone wolves as characteristics. Besides the own experiences of lone wolves, their personal grievances can also be fueled by their identification with the suffering of others. The authors also suggest that the acts of lone wolves can be framed by an ideology or belief system. This statement about ideology is confirmed by Berntzen and Sandberg (2014) who discovered links between the far right wing act of the lone wolf Anders Breivik in Norway and the social movement of the political environment, in this case the right wing anti-Islam movement. While making this point, they do stress that the prognosis of this anti-Islam movement of right wing parties in Norway was non violent and democratic, and that the prognosis of Breivik was violent. Berntzen and Sandberg (2014) recommend representatives of social movements not to use antagonistic diagnosis and war metaphors in their motivational framing because it can be dangerous in two ways: it could inspire political violence, and it could validate and reinforce Jihadist rhetoric about a war on Islam.[lxvi]

While the framing of ideologies and belief systems is relevant, Meloy and Yakeley (2014) additionally state that the radicalisation processes of lone wolves could also be fuelled by their simplistic and rigid way of thinking and emotions, rather than the content of their thinking. Another characteristic is that lone wolves often have problems in their interpersonal relations. Accordingly, actual failure to be accepted by a terrorist group can increase their isolation and belief systems. However, this social rejection can be compensated on the Internet. Lone wolves are characterised by their dependence on virtual communities. According to Meloy and Yakeley[lxvii], a lone wolf, for example, can become dependent on a paranoid pseudo community, in which he believes that everyone is against him, or he can become dependent on a pronoid pseudo community, in which he believes that everyone thinks alike, which can strengthen his beliefs.[lxviii]

The identity of lone wolves could also become complex due to the thwarting of their goals on various fronts – professional, sexual and intimate. Sexualisation of violence is often a characteristic. Furthermore, lone wolves are characterised by their creativity and innovative skills. Finally, what is interesting about this model is that unlike terrorists, who are often characterised by their normality, this model characterises some lone wolf terrorists by their psychopathology. Hence, the connection between psychopathology, such as delusions, and ideology plays a larger role in lone wolf terrorism. In line with this, the authors stress that lone wolves can be characterised by a predatory mode, because they conduct research, plan, prepare and implement the actual violent act.

McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) also contributed to the understanding of lone wolf terrorism with their attempt to profile lone wolves. They analysed case studies of lone wolf terrorists and reviews of lone actor violent offenders (not lone wolf terrorists, but rather

assassins and school attackers). While conducting this research, they focused on the question of why lone wolves would sacrifice their own lives. In their analyses, they found that grievances, experiences with weapons, depression (and other mental disorders), and personal disconnection and maladjustment (unfreezing) were characteristics of a disconnected-disordered lone wolf profile. Other lone wolves, however, seem to have a caring-consistency lone wolf profile, in that they strongly feel the suffering of others. This feeling comes with a sense of responsibility that they need to revenge those who suffer or reduce their suffering. The latter profile seems less common. From McCauley and Moskalenko's perspective, the combination of a radical opinion and the opportunity and availability of the means to conduct radical and violent attacks is dangerous. This causes them to conclude that one should pay attention to the opportunity and means for radical action to decrease the potential risks for lone wolf terrorism.[lxix]

A final advice on detecting lone wolves was delivered by Neumann, who states that their history of online activism is long. Because they could leave virtual traces, analysts can identify lone wolves. These traces are, for example, "sudden changes in behavior, escalating (and increasingly specific) threats, requests for bomb making instructions, contacts with foreign-based insurgent groups, or announcements of imminent action".[lxx]

Policy advice

- The threat of lone wolf terrorism appears to be rising and counter terrorism policy and professionals should be aware of this trend and how potential lone wolves may be recognised.
- An important factor in this recognition process is awareness that some lone wolves have had a history of mental illness. This might prompt deliberation on whether to take policy measures to support collaboration between mental health services and law enforcement agencies.
- Because of the manner in which lone wolves tend to radicalise (largely online), they can leave considerable digital footprints in terms of searches for radical groups, equipment, etc. This can leave them vulnerable to the efforts of intelligence and police agencies, who should be extra alert to this threat.

5. Rehabilitation/ reintegration/ de-radicalisation

5.1 Dealing with the aftermath of an attack

Hegemann and Kahle (2015)[lxxi] note that the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack is a crucial period in the relationship between a government and its people. There is a general sense that the government must "do something." The authors note, using the example of the introduction or potential introduction of biometric passports in America and some European countries, that this imperative can tempt governments down two paths, both of them mistaken ones: the temptation to implement measures claiming that they are "effective" without the empirical evidence to back up this claim, and that of excusing invasive measures by invoking the name of security. The author's note that such actions are foolish, adding that "researchers should hold officials accountable to their claims of effective problem-solving as much as possible" (p200)

It is crucial that policy makers within Europe take note of the warning that they deliver. Measures which can be put in place following a possible terrorist attack should be considered before any such event. The credibility of a government, not to mention the effectiveness of its emergency measures, can be damaged by knee jerk reactions of this nature.

Moghaddam and Breckenridge (2011)[lxxii] describe a positive social phenomenon which is very relevant to government action at this moment. Discussing the public response following the 9/11 attacks as an example, they identify a "post tragedy opportunity bubble," in which citizens show strong support for their leaders and a willingness to make personal sacrifices in order to restore normality. They comment:

"Judging correctly when and how to make constructive use of the opportunity-bubble after a tragedy is a hallmark of great leadership. Enormous potential for civic generosity and sacrifice is available at the height of an opportunity-bubble, but leaders must choose the kinds of sacrifices and the timing of calls to action carefully…We argue that although great crisis will inevitably invite consideration of many alternatives, leadership must pay special attention to opportunities to engage the public as capable partners in their country's response to the crisis – calling upon them as citizens with civic duties, as well as rights."

Moghaddam and Breckenridge identify a phenomenon which should not be underestimated by policy makes. It is the active desire of citizens to make a concrete contribution to the restoration of normality. It may take the form of empathy – take for example the unprecedented number of people willing to donate blood following 9/11, also cited by these authors – or of other practical contributions, but it represents a very concrete resource in the wake of a terrorist attack and one which policy makers would do well to be aware of. Some energy may usefully be invested in creating plans for how to best and most effectively use this citizen input in case of future attacks. Types of potential mobilization may differ according to country and the circumstances at hand, but the contribution of citizens to a recovery process can ultimately strengthen community bonds, thereby undermining the purpose of a terrorist attack and working against the "vicious circle model" described elsewhere in this article.

Policy advice

- It is crucial to be aware that in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack, citizens look to their government more than ever for leadership.
- Equally crucially, knee jerk reactions and measures which are not in fact proven to be effective but are claimed to be so, can be detrimental in the longer term.
- Bearing the last two points in mind, energy can usefully be invested in preparing thoroughly for the eventuality of a possible future attack as to what measures can best be put in place in its immediate aftermath to reassure the public that the government is responding in a competent, considered way.
- Plans can usefully be made by governments before any attack has taken place as to how the post tragedy opportunity bubble, in which a great degree of energy and will comes from the general population to restore order and help those affected, could best be utilised. This can not only be genuinely valuable in returning to normality – it can also help to improve community cohesion.

5.2 Dealing with victims of a terrorist attack

Another group which calls for the specific attention of policy makers following a terrorist attack are those who have been directly affected by it. Muro (2015)[lxxiii] analyses the

differences in how victims of terrorism in both Spain and England are able both to organize themselves and influence policy in the wake of a terrorist attack. He concludes that while in Spain victim groups are well represented and have created a forum in which their voices can be heard and reflected at political level, British victims of terrorism have not. The author makes a convincing case for taking the needs of the victims into serious consideration, concluding:

"The experience of victimhood produces a very particular understanding of terrorism that reflects an aspect of a given conflict, the one that is played out through its victims. As societies push forward for solutions to the conflicts and cleavages that affect them, governments have no other chance than to balance out the policies of de-radicalization and accommodation with the demands of the advocacy groups that represent the victims of terrorism." (p490)

We recommend referring to the Handbook produced by the RAN (Radicalisation Awareness Network) on this subject as a comprehensive guide on how to deal with victims of terrorism. You can find this document here: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-rvt/docs/ran_vvt_handbook_may_2016_en.pdf

Policy advice

- European governments should have legislation and mechanisms in place to assist and support victims of future terrorist attacks. These must be tailor made to suit the cultural context and the circumstances of the victims, and should include mechanisms through which the victims themselves can be consulted as to their needs.

5.3 Incarceration of those convicted of terrorism related offences

A recent case study of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammed (Carlos Bledsoe, a lone wolf shooter who attacked the Little Rock Army and Navy recruitement centre in 2009 in Arkansas, US) (Gartstein-Ross, 2014)[lxxiv], though unconvincing in its attempt to illustrate that Islam played a crucial role in Bledsoe's radicalisation, does manage to illustrate that incarceration of those convicted of terrorist acts is a point of attention for policy makers. The author describes how Bledsoe continued to perpetrate violent acts within the prison and recruited at least one other prisoner to his cause.

Dugas and Kruglanski (2014)[lxxv] make a highly academic contribution to this discourse. They present a convincing argument that a process which they call a "significance quest" is a driving factor of a radicalisation process. All people, they argue, are driven by a desire "to matter," or "to be someone." For most people, goals of health, security and wellbeing are crucial factors in this construct – however, for those individuals who choose to participate in violent extremism, the radical group offers a higher "gain" in these stakes than the more conventional choices of wellbeing and health. They continue to apply their conclusions to the situation of those imprisoned for terrorist acts, based upon extensive research carried out in Sri Lanka amongst a prison population of men and women imprisoned for their involvement with the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in Sri Lanka. Although the authors recognise some limitations to their study, they do successfully identify three main components

of a prison de-radicalisation program which bear fruit: segregating the more serious, committed offenders from the less committed ones, focusing on individual wellbeing instead of that of the radical group, and providing vocational training.

Dugas and Kruglanski's article is based on finding which were not gathered within the European setting. However, it is based upon Kruglanksi *et al's* Significance Quest model, previously discussed in this review, and can therefore be taken to be based upon a psychological model universal in its application.

We can therefore draw the following points from the research of Gartstein-Ross and of Dugas and Kruglanski:

Policy advice

- The logistics of the incarceration of those who have been convicted of terrorist offences is an important point.
- It is unwise to imprison those who are deeply committed on a long term basis to the terrorist cause alongside those who are for example offending for a first time. This may inhibit the capacity of newer offenders to leave the extreme group behind when exposed to de-radicalisation programmes and even provide some offenders with the opportunity to use the prison setting for recruitment purposes.
- Elements which help prisoners focus upon their own individual perspective, drawing attention away from the group perspective (for example yoga and meditation) can be helpful components of de-radicalisation programs.
- Similarly, elements which focus upon helping an individual to build up a positive image of his or her future through providing a broad range of occupational training also help to contribute to an image of the future in which prisoners can find a sense of significance away from the extreme group.
- Ensuring that prisoners are treated in a respectful way avoids humiliation. This is vital in that humiliation can once again detract from a sense of personal significance, thereby undermining the message of the de-radicalisation program.

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